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"OMNE CORPUS FUGIENDUM?" AUGUSTINE AND PORPHYRY ON THE BODY AND THE POST-MORTEM DESTINY OF THE SOUL1

M ichael Chase
Over the past decade or so, a number of important studies have focused on the complex question of the religious philosophy of Porphyry of Tyre, as set forth in his lost work On the return o f the soul (D e regressu anim ae),2 the fragments of which are transmitted almost exclusively by Augustine. Follow ing in their wake, the present article seeks to contribute a few supplemen tary considerations to this topic. In particular, I shall concentrate on the Porphyrian dictum "all bodies must be fled," which is the object of Augus tine's polemical attention in the D e civitate Dei. I shall attempt to discover the meaning of this phrase within the context of Porphyry's eschatology, as influenced by the Chaldaean Oracles and attested by, among others, Synesius of Cyrene.
In a study published in 1994, Michele Cutino1 2 3 scrutinized the early dialogues of Augustine, and found in them many traces of polemics against Porphyry and his followers. By comparing the findings of previous scholar ship w ith allusions in Augustine's Dialogues, Cutino believes he can recon struct many features of the original tone and content of Porphyry's D e regressu. Porphyry presented in the style of oracular revelations a philosophy whose goal was the perception of the intelligible world, of God (parens universitatis) and of a providential order, which, although imperceptible at first glance, rules and arranges all events in the world for the best.4 This philosophical ascent was to be facilitated or made possible by the encyclope dic study of the liberal arts5 and of philosophy, in the form of a tripartite division into logic or dialectic, ethics, and physics or metaphysics. Through out the De regressu, Cutino argues, the philosophical attitude of Porphyry and his followers was characterized by skepticism and elitism: skepticism in so far as he remained unconvinced that the goal of complete knowledge could be achieved in this life;6 elitism in that he believed such philosophical knowledge was reserved for the few.7 Porphyry sought to integrate theurgy and philosophy, in a last-ditch attempt to preserve and defend the tradi tional Greek religion he held so dear.8
Augustine's overall response to Porphyry's De regressu was ambiguous. O n the one hand, he adopted some of its essential elements, such as the important role of oracular pronouncements and the call for the study of the liberal arts; on the other, he faulted Porphyry for failing to admit that the true oracles are not Chaldaean but Christian, and that the true mystery is Christ's Incarnation. He also rebelled against Porphyry's elitism, arguing 4. C f especially Augustine, C. acad., 1, 1, 1: "nihil seu commodi seu incommodi contingit in parte, quod non conveniat et congruat universo. Quam sententiam uberrimam doctrinarum oraculis editam remotamque longissime ab intellectu profanorum, se demonstraturam veris amatoribus suis, ad quam te invito philosophia pollicetur." 5. Here the author takes up and develops a discovery of Ilsetraut Hadot; cf. I. Hadot, 1984, pp. 101-136. 6. This skepticism is what N. Cipriani (1997) refers to as Porphyry's "pessimism." According to this author, Augustine combated Porphyry's "pessimism" in his early works, maintaining the possibility of divine vision and perfect happiness in this life on earth. In his later works, however, Augustine evolved to a position closer to that of Porphyry: only a few spiritual people will succeed in achieving true wisdom in this life, but for the majority their knowledge and therefore happiness will be perfected after this life ("post hanc autem vitam et cognitio perficietur," V rel., 53, 103). 7. Cf. H. Lewy, 1978, pp. 452-453: "...he [sc. Porphyry] is aware that philosophical purification is accessible only to a small group of privileged people... he thus concludes on a note of perplexity which constitutes the dominant tone of his entire religious philosophy..."
8. More recently, C. van Liefferinge (1999) has argued that it was Iamblichus whose thought was characterized by the attempt to revive pagan religion in the guise of what his opponents called theurgy. Many of C. van Liefferinge's methods and results seem to me to be questionable, but this is not the place to enter into this debate. that in the Christian era salvation and felicity have been made available to all, regardless of their intellectual accomplishments and capacities.9
In a paper first read in 1996 but not published until 1999, Jeannie Carlier (1999) surveys the primary and secondary evidence for Porphyry's views on the topic of reincarnation, views which, today as well as in Antiq uity, have been the subject of conflicting interpretations. She cautiously concludes that, as Augustine reports, Porphyry did indeed reject the Pla tonic and Plotinian doctrine that the human soul may be reincarnated in the body of an animal, and that, through ethical purification by means of the virtues, an abstemious lifestyle, and the practice of philosophy, it is possible for human beings to reach the stage where they are freed from the cycle of rebirth. Reunited with the Intelligible world from which they came, these souls of the righteous are thus no longer reincarnated,10 1 1 but spend eternity in blissful contemplation.
Still more recently, M.B. gave another important con tribution to the study of Porphyrian eschatology. Starting from the convic tion -which I believe to be correct and important -that Porphyry's escha tological and soteriological thought is fundamentally Chaldaean, Simmons re-examines the testimonies from Augustine's De civitate Dei, concerning Porphyry's eschatological doctrine as set forth in the De regressu. He con cludes that Porphyry believed in a threefold path to salvation. As Carlier had pointed out, the pursuit of rationality and philosophy can, according to Porphyry, lead to ultimate beatitude, in the form of union with the Father, never again to be interrupted by incarnation and the woeful experiences of human life and contact with matter. Yet this path is not for everyone: only a select few are able to live according to the intellect in the requisite way. For the rest of humanity -who constitute the vast majority -there remains a choice between two paths, both of which may enable the soul, after death, to rise up only to the highest regions of the elemental world, and not, like the first option, to the intelligible: either one may lead a life of ascetic moderation, or else one may have recourse to the purificatory rituals of theurgy, which purify the anima spiritatisi This explains Porphyry's 9. This point is emphasized repeatedly in N. Cipriani, 1997, passim. 10. On this doctrine, which Carlier holds to be unique to Porphyry, c f A. Smith, 1974, pp. 56 ff. 11. As we shall see below, in Porphyry's psychology this part or faculty of the soul corresponds to the irrational soul and/or the faculty of imagination, often referred to as the pneuma or pneumatic soul, which, among many other functions, preserves the traces of our pdqq, and acts as the medium through which we are contacted and influenced by demons and other non-human agents. a ttitu d e to C h rist, as evinced in th e Contra Christianos an d in an oracle o f H ecate:12 Jesus was a pious m an , n o t unlike the Essenes w h o m P orphyry praises in th e D e abstinentia;13 b u t after his d eath he was able to ascend only to the sphere o f th e astral deities.
A ugustine's a ttitu d e to the P orphyrian doctrines he reports in the Civ. D ei, an d uses tacitly elsewhere, has em erged w ith renew ed clarity as a result o f these an d o th e r recen t stu d ies.14 A ugustine congratulates P orphyry for correcting his m asters P lato an d P lo tin u s on several p o in ts, w hile fustigating h im for n o t having h a d the courage to take his objections against th em to th e ir logical conclusion, an d em bracing the only tru e doctrine: th a t o f C h rist an d th e C h u rc h .15 A ccording to th e B ishop o f H ip p o , P orphyry did well to refuse th e possibility th a t h u m a n souls m ay be reincarnated in ani m als. H e rightly saw th a t they can re tu rn only to h u m a n bodies; b u t it is a sham e, says A ugustine, th a t P orphyry failed, or d id n o t dare, to accept th a t th e souls will re tu rn to their own bodies, viz. at the R esurrection. P orphyry was rig h t to reject the claim th a t th eu rg y can n o t b rin g ab o u t the salvation o f th e in tellectual soul, b u t was culpably negligent in recom m ending its crim i nal techniques to th e n o n -p h ilo so p h ical m asses.16 Even P orphyry's m eta physics is basically acceptable to A ugustine: the Tyrian is rig h t to preach the (C haldaean) F ather an d th e Paternal Intellect, w hich A ugustine has no tro u ble assim ilating to th e Son o f th e C hristians; yet he accuses P orphyry o f deliberate evasiveness in failing to m e n tio n the H oly Spirit, unless this is w h a t he m eans b y th e m ysterious "th ird en tity "17 he postulates betw een the F ather an d the Paternal Intellect. T h e sam e holds true for P orphyry's episte m ology: as we shall see, his d istin ctio n betw een the intellectual p a rt o f the soul, by w h ich intelligible realities are perceived, an d the p h an tastic or spiritu al p a rt o f th e soul, on w hich images are p rin ted , is w holly taken over by A ugustine, at least in the later w o rk D e Genesi a d litteram. O th e r accusa tions are m ore ten d en tio u s an d less probable: P orphyry is, claims A ugustine, 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 12. Quoted, no doubt via Porphyry, by Augustine, Civ. Dei, 19, 23 ; cf. Arnobius, Adversus nationes, I, 34 ff. For analysis of this oracle, see F. Culdaut, 1992; 1993. 13. De abstinentia, IV, 11 f. 14. Cf. M. Alfeche, 1995. 15 . Thus, for Augustine, the "universal way of salvation," which Porphyry admitted he had been unable to find, is in fact Christianity; cf. Civ. Dei, 10, 32, 1, quoted by N. Cipriani, 1997, p. 125 & n. 38. 16. E.g. Porphyry, De regr., fr. 7, pp. 34*-36* Bidez. 17. Porphyry, De regr., fr. 8, pp. 36*, 14-37*, 6 Bidez. This intermediary entity may have been Hecate, assimilated by the Oracles to the World Soul; cf. W. Theiler, 1966, pp. 266-267. ashamed of polytheism,18 although he dares not denounce it openly; and he is ashamed of his own use of the theurgical doctrines of the Chaldaean Oracles.19 There is, however, one point of Porphyrian doctrine as expressed in the De regressu for which the Bishop of Hippo has nothing but scorn. This is his view that to obtain salvation, it is necessary to flee all bodies: "omne corpus fugiendum est," according to the formula Augustine repeatedly20 attributes to the Tyrian.
Augustine certainly believes, or at least wants his readers to believe, that Porphyry quite literally means that all kinds of bodies are to be avoided; thus he attributes to Porphyry the belief that souls of philosophers will dwell forever with the father without any bodies whatsoever,21 and seeks to 18. M. Cutino, 1994, pp. 43-44 Civ. Dei, 10, 29, p. 450, 21; 22, 26; Retract., 1, 4, 7; Sermo, 242, [6] [7] . Additional citations or allusions to this formula in Augustine are given by W. Theiler, 1966, p. 254 n. 8. 21. Porphyry, De regr., fr. 11, 5, pp . 41*, 26-42*, 2 Bidez: "<Porphyrius> resurrectionem incorruptibilium corporum negans non solum sine terrenis, sed sine ullis omnino catch him in self-contradiction by pointing to the Neoplatonic belief that even the World Soul has a body, which is not particularly bad or evil in itself. Following Augustine's presentation, several recent historians have as serted that Augustine's belief in the resurrection of the body is what most distinguishes him from the Neoplatonists like Porphyry by whom he was influenced.22 It is sometimes held that Augustine's "acceptance" of the body makes his doctrine superior to that of the Neoplatonists, who, by conceiv ing of a bodiless personal immortality, thereby condemn human beings to the post-mortem loss of their personal identity.23
Yet did Porphyry really believe that literally all kinds of bodies must always be avoided? In other words, did he believe that no kind o f body plays a role in human post-mortem existence? This seems questionable, especially in view of the number of meanings the Greek word awm a could bear.24 Besides the body of flesh and blood, this word could designate any of the four elemental bodies of Greek physics: earth, water, air, and fire; in the context of psychology and eschatology, it could also refer to the semi-material pneumatic body, either innate or acquired from outside, which surrounded the immaterial soul and enabled it to interact with the material body of flesh and blood.25 Finally, in later Neoplatonists, the term awm a may also desig nate the innate, imperishable luminous vehicle of the soul, which Hierocles calls the "immaterial body."26 In what follows, I will adduce evidence which, corporibus eas <sc. animas> adseruit in sempiturnum esse victuras;" c f Augustine, Civ. Dei, 10, [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] 22, 26 . This doctrine derives ultimately from Plato's Phaedrus. Simmons, 2001, pp. 202-203 , citing such earlier scholars as P de Labriolle and P. Courcelle. For M.E. Korger (1962) , Augustine's thought is characterized by its emphasis on "the positivity of the Ontic" ("...der Anerkennung der Positivität des Ontischen," 1962, p. 36 n. 4), by which I presume he means that for Augustine, matter, bodies and the physical world in general are fundamentally positive. Cf. ibid., p. 37: "...er anerkennt die relative Positivität der Sinneserkenntnis." Korger also qualifies Augustine's attitude as one of "Biblical realism" ("biblischen Realismus," p. 42), indicated inter alia by his belief that the soul cannot find true happiness until it is reunited with its body at the Resurrection.
23. This is the view of E. Dubreucq, 1997. 24 . The polysemy of the Greek a w g a also led to confusion in the Arabic alchemical tradition. This term could be translated either by the Arabic jasad or by jism, both of which could in turn be used to designate either "metal" or "mineral," sometimes in the same author; cf. P. Kraus, 1942 /1986 , p. 19 n. 1. In 19th-century Iran, Shaykh Ahmad A'sa'î (Sharh al-ziyârat, Tabriz, 1276 similarly distinguishes between the organic, organized body (jasad), and the body as mass or corporeal volume (jism).
25. On this subject, see the recent dissertation by St. Toulouse (2001) . 26. au lo v awma, In Carmen aureum, § 26, 5. I derive my information on Hierocles, as on many other points concerning later Neoplatonism, from I. Hadot, Studies on the Neoplatonist Hierocles, translated by M. Chase, Philadelphia, 2004. I believe, tends to suggest that Porphyry's doctrines concerning "the body" were less unambiguous than Augustine seems to wish us to believe.
Before proceeding, I will own up to some of my methodological princi ples. As I said above, I believe, with M.B. Simmons, that Porphyry's thought is basically Chaldaean in many important respects.27 There appear to be few aspects of Chaldaean thought that Porphyry could not accept. Thus I be lieve it is legitimate to use Chaldaean doctrines attested from elsewhere to help reconstruct Porphyry's thought. Secondly, I believe Synesius of Cyrene, especially in his De insomniis but also in other works, is influenced prima rily by Porphyry and may likewise be used to reconstruct the Tyrian's lost writings.28 The utilization of these sources, together with the careful study of such fragmentarily preserved Porphyrian works as the IPepi Zxuyôç, may enable us to piece together a different picture of Porphyry's eschatology from the one at which scholars have arrived primarily on the basis of Augus tine's testimony in the City o f God.
* * *
Augustine's testimony with regard to Porphyry's eschatological doctrines as expressed in the De regressu must be used with caution. In the first place, it is likely that the Bishop of Hippo knew this work only in the Latin translation by Marius Victorinus, which, in turn, may or may not have been complete.29 More importantly, Augustine was not concerned with practicing the history of philosophy, but with refuting his pagan interlocutors, many 27. It was P. Hadot (1968) who first realized that one main point differentiating Porphyry from Plotinus was the Tyrian's concern to reconcile Neoplatonic with Chaldaean doctrines.
28. This view, first advanced by W. Lang (1926, pp. 57 ff.) ; and utilized extensively by e.g. Theiler (e.g. "Die chaldäischen Orakel," in 1966, p. 255 n. 11; "Porphyrios und Augustin," ibid., pp. 205 f.), Hadot, and Smith, was questioned by W. Deuse (1983) , for whom Synesius is dependent upon Iamblichus. I do not consider Deuse's arguments to be conclusive; c f M. Chase, "What does Porphyry mean by ^ewv paxqp?" Dionysius, XXII (Dec. 2004), pp. 77-94. 29. This question is, o f course, linked with the controversial question o f the nature and content of the libri Platonici Augustine mentions he read in the translation of Marius Victorinus. It has been held that these consisted a) only of works by Plotinus; b) only of works by Porphyry; and c) of a mixture of the two. Following M. Cutino and P. Hadot (1971, pp. 201-210) , I believe this last possibility to be the most likely. The attempt of P. Beatrice (1989) to show that the libri Platonicorum consisted exclusively in Porphyry's Philosophia ex oraculis haurienda, o f which many o f what are usually considered his other "works" were only parts, is unconvincing. of whom, as he himself concedes, were followers of Porphyry. W ith this goal in mind, Augustine does not hesitate to use rhetorical ploys, and there is no reason to believe he always stopped short of distorting the pagan doctrines he reports.
W hat, then, are we to make of Augustine's repeated assertion that Por phyry advised his followers that all bodies must be avoided? Clearly, for Augustine's arguments to be effective, Porphyry must have said something similar to this.30 Yet in the original context of the De regressu, he may have gone on to qualify or explain his assertion in ways of which Augustine may have been unaware, or which he may simply not have seen fit to transmit.
In order to decide what Porphyry's assertion may have meant within its original context, we must try to situate it within the overall structure of the Tyrian's philosophical thought. * * * For Porphyry, the question of the post-mortem destiny of the soul was intimately linked with that of the nature and destiny of the pneuma or okhêma, the quasi-material spiritual vehicle which enveloped the soul and, among many other functions, allowed the immaterial to interact with the material body. According to a Chaldaean belief,31 the soul gathers this spir itual body from the celestial spheres during its initial descent from the intelligible to the sensible world.32 Once the individual soul is incarnated in a human body, the pneuma/okhêma becomes closely associated with the lower, irrational soul in general and the imagination in particular. Through out the individual's lifetime, it fulfills the function of a medium: our pas sions (p a^h ) are imprinted upon it, and it preserves their traces; through it we receive the visions of dreams and prophetic or demonic trances.33 Be cause of its link with the passions, the pneuma is affected by our moral 30. As indeed he does in some passages of his preserved writings; cf. A d Marc., 10, where he speaks of his wife Marcella as one "intending to flee the body" (tp m eletwafl feuyeiv and tou owmatoç).
31. Or. chald., fr. 61 Des Places; cf. P. Hadot (1968) , I, p. 181 & n. 2, citing H. Lewy, 1978, p. 182 n. 26. 32. An ancient and widespread belief, perhaps arising in the context of Babylonian astronomy, and attested in Gnosticism and Hermetism (CH, VI, 2-3; X, 16-18); cf. P. Hadot (1968), I, pp. 180-182; 340 & n. 5; J. Pepin, 1987, pp. 141-142 behavior.34 A life o f subservience to the passions, characterized by overin dulgence in rich food, sleep, w ine, sex, an excessive concern for w ealth, glory, fam e an d th e vicissitudes o f th e sensible w orld in general, causes the p n e u m a to becom e m oist, thick, an d heavy, a p h e n o m e n o n P orphyry assim i lates to th e co n d en satio n o f rain -clo u d s.35 By contrast, a life devoted to asceticism an d p h ilo so p h y dries o u t the p n e u m a , causing it to becom e airy an d lig h t.36 T h is m aterial q u ality o f the p n e u m a proves to be o f fun d am en tal im p o rtan ce to th e post-m ortem existence o f the soul: if, at the m o m e n t o f d eath, the p n e u m a /okhêma is lig h t an d dry, its natu ral upw ard in clin atio n will n o t h in d er the soul as it rises back up to the intelligible world. If, however, th e soul's p n eu m a is m o ist a n d heavy, its d ow nw ard in clin atio n will drag the soul u n d e rg ro u n d .37 Indeed, th e soul's "descent to H ad es," as described in m y th an d religion, is n o th in g o th e r th a n this dow nw ard tendency o f the p n eum a, an d the dark, su b terran ean existence it subsequently leads.38
It is likely th a t Porphyry's eschatology rem ained essentially faithful to the constellatio n o f beliefs su rro u n d in g th e central C haldaean ritual o f the soul's elevation (avayw yq).39 T h is seems to have consisted in a tw o-stage process:
first, theurgical purificatio n s for th e soul's p n eu m a or the irrational soul led to u n io n w ith the lesser, p lan etary gods a n d /o r angels, in the realm o f the Ether. Secondly, th e sm all fractio n o f m a n k in d w ho w ere capable th ereo f w o u ld use p h ilo so p h y an d co n te m p la tio n to pu rify th eir intellectual soul, w h ich w o u ld lead to u n io n w ith th e C h aldaean Father, and substantial id en tificatio n w ith the Paternal Intellect. P orphyry apparently th o u g h t th at 3 4 3 5 3 6 3 7 3 8 3 9
34. Synesius, ibid., 6, 18-19: e n a ie i yap to pveuma xouxo xqç y u x ik q ç ÔLaqéaewç k a i ouk a<jumnaqéç e o n ... 35. Porphyry, De antro nympharum, § § 10-11. 36. Synesius, ibid., 6, 22-23: xo npwxov auxqç k a i fdiov oxhMa, ayatfuvomevq mev lenxuvexai k a i anaitfepouxai, kakuvomevq 5e pa%uvexai k a i yeouxai...; ibid., 7, 23-25: xqç xe a p io rn ç e^ew j ev yu% aiç e la f p if o u a h j auxo k a i evanomopyvumévnç k q ltô a xqç xeipovoç.
37. Synesius, ibid., 7, 23-30; Porphyry, Sentence 29; De ant. nymph., § § 11-12. 38. Cf. the references in the preceding note. More precisely, since the soul, being incorporeal, is not situated within space or time, for the soul to be in Hades just means for it to preside over an image (oxav npoeaxqkh etdwlou), Sent. 29, p. 18, 1-2 Lamberz), which, since it possesses a murky existence, is naturally at home in the underworld. The transformation of the soul's pneuma into an eidwlov characterized by dark vapors, is, in turn, the result of its yielding to passions and concern for the sensible world; cf. Synesius, De insomniis, 7, with the comments of D. Susanetti, 1992 , pp. 126-127. 39. M.B. Simmons, 2001 , p. 214, following P. Hadot, 1978 . On the avaywyq, cf. H. Lewy, 1978, Excursus VIII, pp. 487-489. this process of moral and contemplative ascent via purification rarely or never met with complete success in the course of one human lifetime. Yet this did not represent a serious objection, for he believed the process could be completed, through the agencies of grace and divine providence, after the individual's death.40 This may be confirmed by an overlooked passage from Porphyry's Sentence 32, in which he gives canonical formulation to the Neoplatonic doctrine of the virtues. After having distinguished the politi cal, purificatory, theoretical, and paradigmatic virtues,41 Porphyry notes that we should concentrate on the purificatory virtues, "because they can be obtained during this very life" (oti to u tw v m^v h te u^iç ev tw ßtw to u tw , p. 31, 10 Lamberz). This clearly implies that the two higher stages of virtue -the theoretical and the paradigmatic virtues -cannot be obtained during this life; a conclusion reinforced by the appellations given to the person who successively achieves each stage of virtue. He who is active in accordance with the political or practical virtues, writes Porphyry, is a sage (apouôaioç); he who instantiates the purificatory virtues is a demonic man or a good demon (Saim ovioj a v^p w p o j ^ k a i S ai^w v a y a^o ç ). Now, CTPOudaioç is an epithet clearly applicable to living human beings; it is the Stoic technical term for the sage. It was also possible, and common since Homer, to apply the epithet S aim ovioj to living persons. It is, however, unusual if not unheard-of to speak of a living person as a S at^w v; and when one reads that the person having acquired the theoretical or noetic virtues is a god (qeoç), and that he who acts according to the paradigmatic virtues is a father of the gods (qewv p a fp p ), we are forced to assume that 40. Porphyry, De regr., p. 37*, 17-21 Bidez: "...Platonis sententiam sequens nec ipse dubitas in hac vita hominem nullo modo ad perfectionem sapientiae pervenire, secundum intellectum tamen viventibus omne quod deest providentia Dei et gratia post hanc vitam posse compleri." Cf., with N. Cipriani, 1997, pp. 117-188, Augustine, C. acad., 3, 9, 20 : "Audi, amice, philosophia non est ipsa sapientia, sed studium sapientiae vocatur, ad quam te si contuleris, non quidem dum hic vivis sapiens eris (est enim apud Deum sapientia, nec provenire humani potest) se cum te tali studio satis exercueris atque mundaveris, animus tuus eapost hanc vitam, id est, cum homo esse desieris, facile perfruetur." The idea that philosophy is not wisdom, but the love and consequent pursuit of wisdom, derives ultimately from Plato's Symposium. these stages can be achieved only in the afterlife, since it is inconceivable that Porphyry could call a living human being qeO j, or a fortiori ^e w v paTpp.42 I believe, therefore, that these expressions are to be taken quite literally, and refer to the post-mortem ontological status of the individual. The person whose political virtues enable him to live in an exemplary way within terrestrial human society is a sage; the purified person is "demonic" while he lives, and, presumably, a good daimôn when he dies. After physical death, the process of ethical progress may continue; the practitioner of theoretical virtues, who lives according to the intellect and has eliminated the passions, becomes a god. Finally, he who has assimilated and actualized the paradigmatic virtues becomes "father of the gods," whatever the precise meaning of this enigmatic formula may be.43
Some historians have suggested that Augustine, despite his opposition to some aspects of Porphyrian soteriology, may even have derived his own views on the nature of the resurrection body from none other than the Tyrian philosopher. This possibility, first hinted at by W. Theiler, was set forth with new arguments by G. Watson in 1982 Watson in -1983 . Watson points to Augustine's concept of visio spiritalis in his De Genesi ad litteram, XII. As for Porphyry, so here for Augustine, the spiritus, as distinct from the intellect (mens), is that in which images of corporeal things are produced and con tained (ch. 7); and Augustine, following Paul (I Cor. 14, 44), speaks of the resurrection body as a corpus spiritale. At the resurrection, Augustine writes that heavier bodies shall take the lower place, and the sadder, body-like souls shall go below. Perhaps most significantly, for the Augustine of De Gen. ad litt., the spiritus is the locus of the afterlife: the places of punishment where the guilty souls are transported after death are not, he says, physical places but locapoenalia similia corporibus, and the sorrows or joys one experiences in the post-mortem state are facta de substantia spiritali. These views are hinted at in the Porphyrian passages we have referred to above; whereas in the IPepi Zxuyôç Porphyry states, while discussing Homer's description of the post-mortem punishments in Hades: It is unlikely to be a coincidence that that same concept of the nveupa--oXhMa-favtaCTta as the organ of post-mortem punishments is also to be found in Synesius:
The places o f punishment for the unjust are on the other side o f the river, for it is through reasoning and the memory o f what they have experienced that they have their punishment; they receive the impressions ppavT acaai) o f the evil they have done, and they are punished as their misdeeds are presented to them in their reasoning, and it wreaks vengeance on them by the punishments attributed for the various misdeeds.
The word qeopdxwp exists in
Now, this psychic pneuma, which the blessed ancients called the pneumatic soul, becomes both a god and a multifarious demon, and an image (eidw lov), and it is in it that the soul expiates its punishments.45 * * * That Augustine was familiar with at least some features of Porphyry's doctrine of the pneuma seems certain, as we can see from the following passage:
Porphyry says that theurgy is usefulfor purifying a part o f the soul: the intellectual part, whereby the truth o f intellectual things is perceived, but the spiritual part, by which the images o f corporeal things are grasped.46
Thus, Augustine knows that Porphyry taught that theurgy is useful for the purification of the spiritalis pars animae, which preserves images of corporeal things. There can be little doubt that "spiritalis" here translates the Greek n v e u m a ttk o j,47 and refers to the lower or irrational soul,48 which 44. Op.cit., p. 228. 45. Synesius, De insomn., 7, [17] [18] [19] [20] : to ye to t nvenpa to n to to ynxtkov, o k a t pvenuatLKhv ynx h v npoahyopenaav o't eüôatpoveç, k a t qeoç k a t 5atpw v navto ô an o ç k a t e'tôwlov y m e ta t, k a t t d nom a ev toutw tm e i ynxfiç.
46. Porphyry, De regr., fr. 2, p. *28, 3-6 Bidez: "<Porphyrius> dicit <theurgian> esse mundandae parti animae, non quidem intellectuali, qua rerum intellegibilium percipitur veritas... sed spiritali, qua corporalium rerum capiuntur imagines." 47. Elsewhere, Augustine equates this "spiritual part of the soul" with that part of the soul which is inferior to the intellect ("ipsam spiritalem, id est nostrae animae partem mente inferiorem"), fr. 3, p. 32*, 1-2; cf. Synesius, De insomn., 4, 18: a u rq [sc. h f a v t a o t a ] Zwn t t ç e m a t p^p o v bnoßaaa...
48. E.R. Dodds, 19632, p. 318 n. 5. Cf. É. Gilson, 1987, p. 56 n. (I) b): "Dans sa signification porphyrienne, spiritus désigne à peu près ce que nous nommons imagination reproductive ou mémoire sensible." Porphyry held to be closely linked to the imagination, either as its substrate, or else as identical therewith. Elsewhere in his quotations and paraphrases from the De regressu, Augustine attests Porphyry's beliefs that the Chaldaean purifications of the pneumd49 do not render this lower part of the soul immortal,50 nor do they lead the soul to return after death to the Father, but only enable it to be elevated as far as the realm of the aether, where it will dwell in the company of gods51 and angels. Only the intellectual part of the soul may, by the grace of God and providence, become consubstantial with the paxpikOç vouç which Augustine identifies with Christ, the son of God.52 In this case, as we saw above, the soul may remain with God forever, eternally exempt from further reincarnations and contact with the evils of the material world.53
Augustine is thus familiar with the Chaldaean idea of purification of the pneumd. Yet in what precisely might this purification have consisted? To attempt to answer this question, we must examine Porphyry's conception of the post-mortem fate of the okhema-pneuma and the irrational soul which is so closely linked to it. Smith, 1974, p. 58 n. 7. 54. In Stobaeus, Eclogae, I, 49, 35, vol. I, p. 370, 5-13 Wachsmuth: "Its proper powers are projected by the soul... and the lives that are projected in whatever way are let go, and no longer exist" (TOj o'ik e fa ç ôuvameiç ppoßdXXe<7qai UpO x ç yu%qç... k a i a f f e c t a i mev k a i mhkéxi e'iv a i x a ç Xwaç x aç onwaouv ppoßXqqeLCTaj).
we learn that according to Porphyry the forms of life55 which the soul projects are released, so that they no longer exist. However, a bit further on we read56 that Porphyry held that each irrational power or faculty of the soul is released into the overall life of the All, where it remains unchanged in so far as it is possible. Yet a third testimony, this time from Proclus,57 seems to resolve the apparent contradiction of these two reports. After describing the views of the "older commentators," such as Atticus and Albinus, who de creed that all irrational life, including the soul's vehicle, is destroyed after death, Proclus writes as follows:
Those who were more moderate and more gentle, like Porphyry, refuse to spread the so-called destruction of the okhêma and the irrational soul, but they say they are resolved into their elements and dissolved, in some way, into the same spheres from which they obtained their composition; they say they are mixtures (phuramata.) from the celestial spheres, and that when it descends, the soul collects them, so that they exist and do not exist, but they no longer exist as such, nor does their distinguishing characteristic persevere.
It appears, then, that what Porphyry means by saying that after death the irrational soul/okhêma/pneuma both "exists and does not exist" is that the soul, as we saw above, gathers up elements from the various celestial spheres as it descends, and restores them to the same spheres as it re-ascends after death, where they continue to exist with a minimum of further trans formation. Thus the elements that make up the vehicle, pneuma, or irra tional soul do continue to exist, but not as such; not, that is, as the vehicle, pneuma, or irrational part of an individual incarnate soul, but as elements of the whole.
Andrew Smith is surely right to add, however, the following caveat:
55. That is, the powers of the soul. Cf I. Hadot, 2004, p. 3 n. 12. 56. Loc.cit., I, 49, 43, vol. I, p. 384, 19-385, 10 : "Each irrational power is dissolved into the overall life of the All, from which it was partitioned off, whereby, as Porphyry considers, it remains as unchanged as possible" (luexat ekdorh duvam j aloyoç etç x^v olhn xou pavxoç a f pç apemept<jqh> p kaì oxt m ultata m^vet amexdpihtoç, WCTPep hïeixat llopfuptoç). 57. Proclus, In Timaeum, vol. III, p. 234, ot 5e xouxwv mexptwxepot, WCTPep o't pept nopfuptov, kat ppaoxepot papatxouvxai mev xhv kaXouu.évhv f^opav KaxaCTkeôavvuvat xou xe oxhmaxoç kat x ç aiogou ynx^ç, avaoroixeiouCTqai 5e auxd faox kat avaluea^at xtva xpopov e'tç xaç ofatpaç, a f wv xhv auv^eatv elaxe, fupdmaxa 5e etvat xauxa ek xwv oupavtwv ofaipwv kat kaxtouaav auxd aullégeiv xhv yuxhv, wore kat e'tvat xauxa kat mh e'tvat, auxa 5e ekaora mhkéx e'tvat mhde dtamévetv xhv 'tdtôxhxa auxwv.
...it is surely not the case that... Porphyry thought that the irrational or lower soul o f every man would be dissolved after death. The dissolution o f the lower soul is the reward o f the philosopher alone and is, no doubt, a rare phenomenon.58
* * * Some pieces of evidence -none of them perhaps conclusive by itself, but which when taken together are nevertheless suggestive -suggest that Por phyry may have held some positive views about the role of "bodies" in post-mortem existence. Like many features of his eschatology, Porphyry may have derived this doctrine from the Chaldaean Oracles.
Although most allusions to the body in the Chaldaean Oracles are nega tive, at least one Chaldaean oracle59 speaks of "saving the body:" O ther oracles seem to imply that at least some parts traces of the body are not to be abandoned in the process of spiritual ascent (avayw yp):
Nor will you abandon the dregs o f matter at the cliff, but there is a share for the image, too, in the all-shining place .60
It thus seems possible that there was a Chaldaean tradition involving some kind of post-mortem survival of the body, and if there was, Porphyry may well have been influenced by it. * * * It is always risky to attempt to reconstruct Porphyry's doctrines on the basis of those of his successors. This procedure is relatively secure in the case of authors like Augustine and Synesius, in whom the influence of Greek Neoplatonists other than Porphyry is either non-existent61 or relatively limited.
58. Op.cit., p. 67. 59. Or. chald., fr. 128 Des Places: ...ekxetvaç puptov vouv epyov e p e u o e ß f j peuoxov k a t so m a oaw oetç. H. Lewy (1978, 215-216; 219) , following Psellus, maintains that this oracle refers only to the preservation of physical health in this life, and not to any kind of resurrection of the body; but c f the remarks of R. Majercik, 1989, 21-25; 30-46. 60. Ibid., fr. 158: Oo5e to x ç ulhÇ okußalov kphMVW kaxaX elyeiç, a l i a k a t e'tôwlw meptç e ç xopov a m fifd o v x a .
61. One of the bases on which C. Van Liefferinge bases her theories is her assumption that Augustine not only knew the work of Iamblichus, but in works like the De civ. Dei was reacting primarily not to Porphyry but to Iamblichus. Yet there is no solid reason to believe that Augustine ever read Iamblichus; primarily because there is no reason to Yet it may be helpful to sketch the subsequent development of the doctrine of the okhêma/pneuma in Greek Neoplatonism, since many of these devel opments, if not taken over directly from Porphyry, may at least be elabo rations of tendencies already to be found in the works of the Tyrian.62
Later Platonists such as Syrianus and Proclus63 distinguished two b x im a ta : the higher one is immaterial,64 innate and imperishable; the lower vehicle is pneumatic, and consists in a combination of the four ele ments, acquired during the soul's descent through the spheres. As the vehi cle of the irrational soul, this lower pneumatic vehicle is eventually dis solved or purged away. Divine souls have only the luminous oxhm a, de mons have both the pneumatic and luminous oxhM a, while human beings, in addition to these two o x^m a ta , possess in addition a body of flesh and blood.
It seems clear that this schema is not that of Porphyry,65 whose concep tion of the okhêma/pneuma seems to correspond to what the philosophers of the School of Athens call the lower vehicle. These Athenian thinkers would seem to have come up with the idea of the higher vehicle precisely to solve some of the philosophical difficulties implies by Porphyry's doctrines.66
Writing at the very end of pagan antiquity, the Syrian philosopher Damascius67 gives a different account of the post-mortem destiny of man kind. O f people who have lived in a holy and sinless way, he writes, those believe his works were ever translated into Latin. Augustine's Greek was never good enough to enable him to read and understand a philosophical treatise in that language, without the aid of a Latin translation.
62. For what follows, see the masterly exposition by I. Hadot, 2004, ch. 6. 63 . Hierocles and Hermias refer to the psycho-spiritual body both as pneumatic and as luminous; it is both eternal and immaterial. See I. Hadot, loc.cit Glan, 1971, p. 23 n. 104, cited by I. Hadot, loc.cit. 66. These are enumerated by Proclus, In Tim., vol. III, p. 299, [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] cf. Dodds, op.cit., p. 320 & n. 5 . They include the dilemma of either allowing the existence of completely disembodied souls, or else of conferring full immortality on the irrational soul, like Iamblichus. On the doctrine of Iamblichus, see Damascius, In Phaed., § 177, pp. 107 f. Westerink, and Olympiodorus, In Phaed., 10, § 7, p. 145 Westerink, cited by I. Hadot, Hierocles, ch. 6. 67. In Phaed., 1, § 551, Westerink. who are completely bereft of philosophy, dwell on the extremities of the earth,68 and have extremely fine pneumatic bodies. Those who have philo sophized politically -i.e., who have achieved the first stage of the Porphyrian virtues, and have become spoudaioi -dwell in the heavens (obpavoç)69 with luminous bodies. Finally, those who have been completely purified return to the supracelestial place -presumably the intelligible world -where they dwell without bodies.70 Here we note that, contrary to the view of Proclus, the luminous body is not innate, immortal, and ever-present, but may be shed as a result of complete purification.
As we have seen, Porphyry seems not to have gone so far as to allow for the existence of a separate luminous soul-vehicle. Yet his own views may have been tending in this direction, as we can see from the testimony of Synesius.
* * * For Synesius,6 8 6 9 7 0 71 the soul clothes itself during its descent through the spheres with a pneumatic body made of ether. Just before it enters the body, the soul emits into the pneuma particles taken from the summits of fire and of air.72 Thus, the divine body mentioned by the Oracles can be identified with the pure substance of the ether, and after the individual's death, in the optimal scenario, the elements of air and fire in the pneumatic body are transformed back into ether, in which state they accompany the soul in its return voyage to its celestial fatherland. The pneuma, which acts during terrestrial life as an intermediary between the rational and the irrational 68. A reference to Plato, Phaedo, 1l4c1-2: a v o de e'tç xhv x atfap av o'fxhoxv afLKVoumevot x a t ' em yqç olxifom evoi.
69. As P Hadot points out (1968, vol. I, pp. 180-181 & n. 1) , the meaning of the term oupavOç varies in Greco-Chaldaean thought: sometimes it designates the planetary spheres as far as the sphere of fixed stars; sometimes it includes the sphere of fixed stars.
70. aveu swmdxwv; cf. Plato, Phaedo, 114c3-4: aveu xe swmdxwv XW (si xO p ap d p av e'tç xOv epetxa xpóvov.
71. De Insomn., § 7. I here follow the interpretation of D. Susanetti, 1992, pp. 149-151. 72 . This accords with the interpretation of Porphyry's Sentence 29 given by W. Deuse, 1983, pp. 219-222 , as cited by I. Hadot, Hierocles, ch. 6: the pneuma consists of various elemental bodies, which the soul acquires during its descent through the celestial spheres. The first component of the pneuma, the a'l-frepiov aw pa, comes from the totality of the first five spheres; while the second and third components, the a w p a h lto eiô éç and the a w p a ahlhvoetôeç, come from the spheres of the sun and the moon. The fourth component, which renders the pneuma heavy and moist, derives from the sublunary sphere. soul, conserves th e traces o f th e in d iv id u al's passions an d im aginings. T h e re fore, if the p n eum a, p u rified fro m its passions back to its original ethereal state, still preserves som e traces o f ind iv id u al m em ories even w h en it returns to th e region o f th e ether, we m ay have a d o ctrine w hich allows for the survival, at least to som e degree, o f a form o f the individual personality.
I f Synesius' d o ctrin e does in d eed reflect th a t o f Porphyry, m ig h t we n o t have the key to u n d e rsta n d in g A ugustine's ap p aren t confusion w ith regard to P orphyry's d ic tu m th a t "o m n e corpus fu g ien d u m est?" Perhaps w hat P orphyry really affirm ed, in th e original con text o f the D e regressu, was th a t only certain kinds o f bodies m u st be avoided. O r rather, perhaps P orphyry's p rim a ry concern was n o t so m u c h w ith th e avoidance o f bodies as w ith their transformation. H e m ay have held th a t the goal o f spiritual and p h ilo so p h i cal progress was to transform th e in d iv id u al's okhêma/pneuma. T h is concept is at least p artially attested as Porphyrian: avoiding m o ist p n eu m a an d m a in tain in g the vehicle o f one's soul dry, airy, an d light, is, as we have seen, a prerequisite for even b eg in n in g th e post-m ortem ascent back to o u r spiritual ho m e, an d it is likely such p u rificatio n or d e-h u m id ificatio n was the goal o f th e C h aldaean theurgical rites P orphyry recom m ended for the n o n -p h ilo sophical. T h u s, Porphyry m a in ta in e d th a t m oist, dark and heavy bodies m u st be avoided at all costs. Yet he m ay well have added th a t dry, light psycho-spiritual bodies consisting o f fire and air are n o t so m u ch to be avoided as transformed, back in to th e ethereal state from w hich they originated.
In conclusion, I sh o u ld like to propose a reco n stru ctio n o f P orphyrian eschatology w hich, alth o u g h it conflicts to som e extent w ith A ugustine's testim o n y concerning th e D e regressu,73 seems b etter able to explain som e o th e r accounts o f P orphyrian d octrine.
T h e loss o f so m any o f P orphyry's w orks m akes it im possible to verify, b u t we m ay perhaps hazard the guess th a t P orphyry d istinguished different groups o f h u m a n beings in a m a n n e r in w hich the level o f philosophical a p titu d e one achieves is lin k ed to th e elem ental co m p o sitio n o f the psycho -spiritu al vehicle, w h ich in tu rn d eterm ines the n ature an d status o f the in d iv id u al's p o st-m o rte m existence. T h u s, all those w ho w ish to avoid the descent in to H ades after d eath m u st ensure th a t the dank, m o ist elem ents o f th eir p n e u m a have been rendered lig h t an d dry. From this p o in t on, the n o n -p h ilo so p h ical m ajority, w ith th e ir soul-vehicles consisting in fire and in 7 3 73.
I do not consider this a fatal objection. As noted above, Augustine, unconcerned with the finer points of Porphyrian doctrine, may well have had access only to a Latin translation of the De regressu, which in turn may only have reproduced fragments of the Tyrian's work. air, may rise, through the use of theurgy or a life of ascetic virtue, only so far as the sublunary elemental spheres of air and of fire.74 For Porphyry, as for late Antiquity in general, aer is the dwelling-place of demons.75 Might he have believed that such non-philosophical souls simply became demons? Proclus (In Tim., I, p. 77, [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] reports that Porphyry, combining the views of Origen the pagan and Numenius, divided the class of demons into di vine, "by relation" (k a ta a x e s tv ), and evil. Demons "by relation" are "individual souls which have been allotted a demonic portion." For Olympiodorus (In Alc., p. 15, (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 6 ) demons by relation are "the souls of those who have lived well;" cf. Proclus, In Alc., 74, vol. I, p. 60, [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] vol. II, p. 310, 15 ff.) , Proclus reports that it is clear that our soul is present within us as in coordination ( en k a ta ta X e v ), as is the soul o f animals within them. Yet when the soul within us comes to be in relation ( en s%^sei) with the soul in them, it animates the irrational, standing over it from without, in the mode o f relation (cx etik w ç). After all, it comes to be within demons and gods, and it is a demon by relation (ôatuw v k a t a c x e o ty ) and a god, but it is not essentially a demon or a god, since its existence is not appropriate to demons and gods.
It is illuminating to compare this passage with the passage from Synesius76 7 7 we have mentioned above: for this psychic pneuma, which the blessed ancients called " pneumatic soul, " becomes a god and a multiform dem on77 and an image...
The identity in terminology here implies a common source, and the additional evidence cited above concerning "demons by relation" allows us to identify this source as Porphyry.78 Indeed, the Proclan passage looks for all the world like an explanatory amplification of the phrase of Synesius, which clarifies how it is that the human soul or the pneuma can become a god or a demon: it does so by relation (axeTtkW j, k a t a ctxÉctiv). Finally, we recall that according to Porphyry's Sentence 32,79 the person who has ac quired the purificatory virtues is a demonic man or a good demon: the former, presumably, during his terrestrial lifetime, and the latter post mortem.
Thus, according to our hypothetical reconstruction of Porphyrian escha tology, non-philosophers who have led moral lives become, at least tempo rarily, demons "by relation," endowed with psycho-spiritual vehicles of air or fire. We might then suppose that those who, through practicing the political virtues, have been able to transform their vehicle back to its origi nal ethereal state, may rise as far as the heavens, or the ether.
Finally, the tiny number of philosophers who achieve the last two stages of Porphyry's scale of virtues -theoretical and paradigmatic -may eventu ally rid themselves of all kinds of bodies and re-enter the intelligible world, whence, henceforth consubstantial with the hypostasis of the Intellect, they will enjoy eternal contemplation, never again subject to reincarnation within a human body, and the contaminating contact with matter such reincarna tion entails. However, it seems likely that for Porphyry these last two stages of virtue, and of transformation, cannot be attained during earthly exist ence, but only after death.
W hether or not it is justifiable to speak of Porphyrian "pessimism" in this regard, it does seem likely that subsequent Neoplatonists found Porphy ry's doctrine, with its demand for a moral and philosophical askêsis that extends not only throughout this lifetime, but also into the next, to be too demanding. As a result, Neoplatonism from Iamblichus on generally ac cepted the possibility of achieving the highest spiritual goals during one's life on earth. Casting aside Porphyry's reservations with regard to the theurgy of the Chaldaean Oracles, Iamblichus, almost contemporaneously with Por phyry, accepted it wholeheartedly. The later Neoplatonists added a level of hieratic virtues to the four levels made canonical by Porphyry, a doctrine which allowed ultimate spiritual beatitude to be obtained not so much through the rational procedures of philosophy, as through the supra-rational techniques of theurgy.
79. Porphyry, Sentence 32, p. 31, 6-7 Lamberz: ôaimôvioç avqpwpoç q k a t ôafmwn ayaq ô ç.
